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DISCRETIONARY POWER IN THE JUDICIARY
TO ORGANIZE A SPECIAL INVESTIGATING
GRAND JURY
After extensive investigation of the relationship between organized
crime and government, the Kefauver Committee reported in 1951 that much
corruption, because of its local character, was beyond the control of Con-
gress, and that more effective local law enforcement was necessary.1
Ultimately, effective law enforcement depends upon the control over public
officials exercised by the electorate. As the functions of government ex-
pand into areas formerly considered matters of individual concern, it be-
comes increasingly important that irresponsible action be checked. How-
ever, citizen control can only be effective if there is an adequate store of
information available to support an enlightened judgment of the perform-
ance of public officials. And yet, government today "has taken on a com-
plexity of organization and of operation that defies the best intentions of
the citizen to know and understand it." 2 This complexity is aggravated by
the growing number of appointed government employees whose official
acts are not subject to periodic review by the electorate.3 Furthermore,
the existence of the so-called "political machine" with its independent struc-
ture of personal loyalties impedes the exposure of reprehensible conduct.
Clearly, there exists a great potential for the misuse of public office when
government functions beyond the gaze of an informed citizenry.
4
Traditionally, the task of checking the conduct of public officials has
fallen largely to the grand jury, which, because of its unique investigatory
powers, is particularly well equipped to determine the existence of gov-
ernmental corruption.5 The grand jury can subpoena unwilling witnesses,
1 S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951). See King, The Control of
Organized Crime in America, 4 STAN. L. Rxv. 52 (1951), criticizing the committee's
conclusion that the federal government could not control such corruption.
2 In the Matter of the Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23,
65, 89 A.2d 416, 443 (1952).
3 See Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 55 COLUm.
L. REv. 1103, 1118 (1955). This is not only true in the case of party workers re-
warded for their loyalty with public appointments, but applies to civil service ap-
pointees whose trustworthiness or competence also cannot be appraised by the
electorate.
4 1t has been argued that the role of supplying information is filled today by
newspapers and that therefore there is no need for investigating grand juries. See
Cook, New York Troika: Conflicting Roles of the Grand Jury, 11 BtF. L. RFv.
42, 53 (1961) ; Scragg, The Grand Jury, 2 TEMP. L.Q. 317, 318 (1928). Newspapers
undoubtedly do expose areas where investigations are needed. But newspaper reports
of corruption, if unsubstantiated by official investigation, are hardly a sound basis
for exercising control via the ballot; too often they are open to the charge that they
are a product of either "politics" or sensationalism designed to increase circulation.
5 See WLOUGHBY, PRuNcIPI s OF JUDIcIAL AmINSTR0AON 193-94 (1929);
Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J. 687,
694-700 (1932); Konowitz, The Grand Jury as an Investigating Body of Public
Offlcials, 10 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 219, 235 (1936) ; Nahumi & Schatz, The Grand Jury
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cite for contempt, and grant immunity from prosecution. 6 Aside from its
special powers, the grand jury's impressive stature derives from the public's
belief that its investigations are politically impartial and independent of the
executive and legislature. This belief results no doubt from the identifica-
tion in the public mind of the grand jury with the judiciary,7 although in
fact its powers of investigation and accusation are essentially executive.8
It is significant that nearly all of the various investigatory bodies author-
ized to delve into local corruption in the United States have been in some
fashion related to the judiciary 9 and that all states provide for grand juries
even though in many the indictment has given way to the prosecutor's
information.10 Even commentators who advocated abolition of the grand
jury indictment during the first thirty years of the century conceded that
grand juries should be retained as investigating bodies 1 1
Unlike the grand jury, the local district attorney is hampered in the
conduct of an investigation by his lack of power in most jurisdictions to
subpoena witnesses, as well as by his inability to grant immunity from
in Connecticut, 5 Come. B.J. 111, 121 (1931). Virtually all of these authorities
agree that the grand jury is not being fully utilized, generally because of the control
exerted over it by the local prosecuting attorney. See also MAYERS, THE A A xRIC
LEGAL SYsTEM 125-27 (1955).
6 See Dession & Cohen, supra note 5, at 689-98; Konowitz, supra note 5, at
235; Scigliano, The Grand Jury, the Information, and the Judicial Inquiry, 38 OmE.
L. REV. 303, 308-09 (1959).
7 See EDWARDS, THE GRAIN JURY 40-41 (1906); Kaufman, The Grand Jury-
Its Role and Its Powers, 17 FR.D. 331, 334 (1955); Note, The Grand Jury as an
Investigatory Body, 74 HAv. L. REv. 590, 603-04 (1961).
8 See McCarthy v. Clancy, 110 Conn. 482, 495-96, 148 Atl. 551, 557 (1930) ; In re
Application of Clark, 65 Conn. 17, 33, 31 At. 522, 524-25 (1894). See generally
WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 174 n.1; Winters, The Michigan One-Man
Grand Jury, 28 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 137, 145-47 (1945) ; 38 COLUm. L. REv. 1493, 1500
(1938). Insofar as a grand jury makes decisions as to the sufficiency of evidence,
it exercises what has generally been considered a judicial function. See EDWARDs,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 39.
9 Statutory variations from the ordinary grand jury exist in Michigan, Georgia,
and California. Michigan authorizes a judge to appoint himself "a one-man grand
jury," armed with all of the grand jury's investigatory weapons, and allows him to
employ a staff for assistance. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.943-.945 (1954) ; see In re
Investigation of Recount, 270 Mich. 328, 258 N.W. 776 (1935). See generally
Scigliano, supra note 6, at 307-11; Winters, supra note 8; Marsh, Michigas "One
Man Grand Jury," 8 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 121 (1924). Georgia and California provide
for "auditing" grand juries; these are "regular" grand juries organized once each
year with special powers to audit the records and books of all officials within each
county. They t6o may employ accountants to assist them. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 901,
914.1, 919, 925, 926; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 59-309 to -311 (1935). See generally Cham-
berlain, Auditing Grand Jury System Already Functioning in California and Fore-
stalls Legislative Investigations, 12 THE PANEL 6 (1934); Cumming, Georgia Grand
Juries Check on Public Ofcials and Funds, 11 THE PANEL. 1 (1933).
10 A majority of states now use the information system. See Morse, A Survey
of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. Rgv. 101, 123 (1931).
11 To-day the grand jury is useful only as a general investigating body for
inquiring into the conduct of public officers and in case of large conspiracies.
It should be retained as an occasional instrument for such purposes, and the
requirement of it as a necessary basis of all prosecutions for infamous crimes
should be done away with.
U.S. NATIONAL Comm' N ON LAw OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
PROSECUTION 37; see, e.g., WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 364-65; Editorial,
The Grand Jury, A Venerable Nuisance, 8 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 99, 100 (1924). But
see Cook, supra note 4, at 52-53; Scragg, supra note 4, at 318-19.
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prosecution and to initiate contempt proceedings.12  Moreover, he may fail
to investigate allegations of corruption for political reasons. Although he
himself may be untainted, still he may be "sensitive to the delicacy" of
investigating persons upon whom he is dependent for electoral support.' 3
Investigations by legislative committees are subject to constant attack
for lack of jurisdiction to make inquiry and are often stalled by the "ma-
teriality" defense to questions posed.14 In addition, corruption which may
be of great local importance may not sufficiently interest the state legis-
lature.35 If the legislature does proceed to investigate, its decision may be
politically motivated, and even if it is not, the investigation may have
political overtones, at least in the public mind.
To prevent the politically motivated investigation and to reduce ex-
penses,' 6 Michigan has statutorily authorized its judges to appoint them-
selves as one-man grand juries to investigate charges of widespread crime
and corruption.' 7  This system has proved effective,' 8 but it may be un-
desirable to have a judge act as an investigator. Even while exercising
what are essentially prosecutorial powers, a judge remains a judge, and to
the extent that he becomes involved in uncovering political corruption, there
is danger that the prestige of the judiciary, particularly its reputation for
political impartiality, may be impaired.' Indeed, there may be a suspicion
that the judge is using his power to further his own political career.20 In
12 See Dession & Cohen, supra note 5, at 691.
'3 Scigliano, supra note 6, at 309-10. See generally Appleton, Special Counsel
for Grand Juries, 8 TE PANEL 1 (No. 5, 1930) ; Vukasin, The Grand Jury-Useful
or Useless?, 34 CAL. B.J. 436, 443 (1959) ; Note, supra note 7, at 603-04.
14 See generally Dession & Cohen, supra note 5, at 699-700; Note, supra note 7,
at 603-04.
'5 Id. at 603.
16See Marsh, supra note 9, at 123; Scigliano, supra note 6, at 311; Winters,
supra note 8, at 143.
17 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.943 (1954). These one-man grand juries have gen-
erally been called to investigate charges of political scandal. See Marsh, supra
note 9, at 121; Scigliano, supra note 6, at 307.
Is See Marsh, supra note 9, at 123.
39 The "one-man grand jury" has been severely criticized on this ground. See
Gallagher, The One-Man Grand Jury-A Reply, 29 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 20 (1945);
Scigliano, supra note 6, at 313-14; Winters, supra note 8, at 145-46, 148; Note, supra
note 7, at 604-05. Gallagher also argues that the presumption of innocence is
virtually nullified because the indictment is returned by a judge. No adequate answer
has been given to this contention. Since the judge had the power to try persons
he had indicted and persons he had cited for contempt of the one-man grand jury,
there was a serious separation-of-powers problem. See Gallagher, supra; Scigliano,
Inquisitorial Proceedings and Separation of Functions: The Case of the Michigan
One-Man Grand Jury, 38 U. DET. L. Rxv. 82, 86-89 (1960); Younger, The Grand
Jury Under Attack, 46 J. Canm. L., C. & P.S. 26, 223 (1955). This problem was
recognized by the Michigan legislature, which enacted a requirement that contempt
of a one-man grand jury should be tried before a judge other than the judge who
had cited the defendant. MICE. STAT. ANN. §28.944 (1954). Subsequently, a
Michigan court ruled the statute unconstitutional since it deprived the court of its
"inherent right" to cite for contempt. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
held that defendant was denied a fair trial when he was tried for contempt by the
same judge who had conducted the secret proceedings of the one-man grand jury
which gave rise to the contempt citation. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
2 0 See Scigliano, supra note 6, at 313.
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holding unconstitutional a New York statute giving the governor power
to appoint a judge to investigate charges of municipal corruption, then-
Judge Cardozo noted that "centuries of common-law tradition warn us with
echoing impressiveness that this is not a judge's work." 21
Thus, the grand jury is the most effective check on government cor-
ruption. Because of its reputation for political impartiality, it may equally
serve as an instrument to absolve the honest public official.
Statutes in every state grant grand juries the power to investigate.
2 2
An investigation is generally initiated by a "special charge" from the presid-
ing judge. In some states, the authority to give the special charge is ex-
pressly conferred by statute,23 whereas in others, it is implied from the
statutory requirement that the judge charge the grand jury with respect to
its "duties," 2 4 among which is the duty to investigate political corruption.2 5
All states have statutes which provide a procedure for organizing
grand juries.2 8 The term "organization" refers here to the issuance of a
court order to the sheriff to convene a panel of grand jurors and not to the
purely ministerial functions of making jury lists, drawing jurors, and sum-
moning them to appear for duty. A grand jury organized according to a
statute is a "regular" grand jury. This term at common law was used to
distinguish the grand jury regularly returned to the court before the
beginning of each term from the grand jury specially organized in the exer-
cise of judicial discretion at some other time.2 7 At present, some states have
statutes which authorize the organization of special grand juries in certain
circumstances.2 8  The term "special" grand jury will be used here, how-
ever, in its common-law sense to denote a grand jury organized through an
exercise of judicial discretion not specifically authorized by statute.
For purposes of clarification, the "investigatory" grand jury is not a
grand jury separate from the regular and special grand juries. The grand
jury's traditional functions have been indictment and investigation, and
the terms "regular" and "special" refer not to functions but to the method
of organization. Thus, an investigatory grand jury is one which, however
organized, is at that time engaged in investigation. The investigatory
grand jury does not indict; rather, its conclusions are returned to the court
by "presentment," which is a catalogue of the crimes uncovered, the sus-
pected offenders, and the evidence on which the conclusions are based.2
21 In the Matter of Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401, 412, 160 N.E. 655, 658 (1928).
2 2 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 200 (1958); ARE:. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-907, 43-911
(1947) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1109 (1947).
2 3 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 914.1; CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-45 (1958).
24 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1013 (1947); IOWA CODE § 770.15 (1958).
25 See, e.g., IDAHo CODE ANN. § 19-1109 (1947); IOwA CODE § 771.2 (1958).
2 8 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 893-914; MINN. STAT. §§ 628.42-.56 (1962); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit 17, §§ 917-83 (1936).
2 7 See Commonwealth v. Burton, 31 Va. 645, 647 (1832); THOMzPsON & MER-
RiAM, THE ORGANIZATION, CUSTODY AND CONDUCT OF JURIES § 497, at 581 (1882);
4 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1697, at 440-42 (Anderson ed. 1957).2 8 .g., Anx. STAT. § 43-934 (1947); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1015 (1947).
29 See generally Kuh, supra note 3. See also Ford, The Grand Jury, 8 L. Soc'y J.
205, 211 (1938).
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The presentment is then turned over to the prosecutor, who draws up an
information, or to the succeeding grand jury, which reconsiders the evidence
in terms of possible indictment.30
Ordinarily, a grand jury investigation is conducted by the regular
grand jury. On occasion, however, the regular grand jury, particularly in
the large metropolitan areas, may be preoccupied in returning indictments
against alleged felons; 31 and even where the information is used, the grand
jury may already be involved in an intensive investigation of some other
matter and therefore unavailable for a second investigation. If the state
legislature has failed to authorize the calling of a special investigating grand
jury in such situations when a special charge to the regular grand jury
would not be feasible, a judge may in time be confronted with a demand
and an attendant need for immediate investigation which he would be
powerless under the statute to meet. The power and the propriety of
then organizing a special grand jury will be the subject matter of this
Note.
I. THE POWER To ORGANIZE A SPECIAL GRAND JURY
A. Development of the Grand Jury as an "Arm of the Court"
At the time of the Norman invasion of England, there was in each
hundred a body of local citizens whose duty it was to inform the government
of crimes and suspected offenders.32  This Saxon custom continued until
the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 decreed that the sheriff-the chief execu-
tive officer of the county-should select twelve knights to appear in an
accusatorial capacity before the itinerant justice of the royal court at the
S
0 The "presentment" should be distinguished from the "report," which is an
informal accusation directed at general conditions or a specific individual and from
which no indictment is framed. The majority of courts will expunge the "report"
if it does not pertain to an indictable offense. When political corruption has been
involved, however, a few states, emphasizing that unique facts existed which pre-
vented indictment-for example, that the statute of limitations had run or probable
cause could not be established because of reluctant witnesses-have permitted the
grand jury to expose reprehensible conduct which was not subject to punishment.
See Owens v. State, 59 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1952); In re Report of Grand Jury, 152
Fla. 154, 11 So. 2d 316 (1943) ; In the Matter of the Presentment by Camden County
Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 89 A.2d 416 (1952). See generally Kuh, supra note 3;
Van Voorhis, Note on the History in New York State of the Powers of Grand
Juries, 16 ALBAwY L. Rv. 1 (1962) ; Note, The Propriety of the Grand Jury Report,
34 TEXAS L. REv. 746 (1956).
31 See Chamberlin, Special Grand Juries in Illinois, 22 J. Cam-. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
163, 165 (1931). See also Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 633-34, 185 A.2d 135,
175-76 (1962) (dissenting opinion). In 1930, the grand juries in Chicago returned
an average of 457 indictments per month, spending an average of 15 minutes on each
indictment. Chamberlin, supra at 165. In 1961, the regular monthly grand jury in
Philadelphia considered an average of 1,828 bills of indictment. Smith v. Gallagher,
supra at 633, 185 A.2d at 175. Assuming that the grand jury works seven hours per
day for 22 days in a given month, it spends an average of five minutes on each
indictment. However, many states have replaced indictment with the criminal
information. See Morse, supra note 10, at 123.
a2 See EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 5; Glaser, The Political and Historical
Development of the Grand Jury, 8 L. Soc'Y J. 192, 195 (1938).
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beginning of each court term.as The change was intended to increase the
power of the crown by centralizing criminal administration in the hands
of the sheriff, the king's delegate.3 4 This progenitor of the modern grand
jury was essentially an executive body performing an executive function
as public prosecutor.35 Apparently its only investigative function was to
identify the persons who had committed the crimes in question; the pro-
cedure was more closely akin, therefore, to a modern grand jury's passing
upon a particular indictment than to a sweeping investigation of official
misconduct. In 1272, however, the grand jury's investigatory powers were
considerably broadened by the addition of a duty to inquire generally into
the misconduct of public officials, including, significantly, the sheriff him-
self.i 3 6 The sheriff's power to organize the grand jury was not derived
from statute, and the judiciary performed merely a passive role.
37
Eventually, the sheriff's power became purely ministerial and was exer-
cised pursuant to a court order to organize the grand jury.38 This practice
was also not authorized by statute.3 9 Although the grand jury continued
to exercise executive functions, its power to return a "no bill" had freed it
from executive control,40 and it was now primarily responsible to the court
which had ordered its organization. Since it could obviate unjustified
prosecution by refusing to indict, the grand jury became revered as a
protector of individual liberty from executive interference. 41 Indeed, it was
viewed as a counterpoise to the executive and an "arm of the court" whose
investigations were fundamentally judicial.
Nevertheless, criminal investigation is normally characterized as an
executive rather than a judicial function. When a judge without statutory
authorization organizes an investigatory grand jury, it may be thought that
33 See EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 7; Glaser, supra note 32, at 196-97; Kuh,
supra note 3, at 1106.
34 See Kuh, supra note 3, at 1105; Note, supra note 7, at 590.
35 See Glaser, supra note 32, at 201-02.
36 See EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 25; Glaser, supra note 32, at 200-01.
See generally Cook, supra note 4, at 47; Kuh, supra note 3, at 1109.
3 7 See Emw.ARs, op. cit. supra note 7, at 26; Glaser, supra note 32, at 201-02.
38 According to Holdsworth, the change occurred in the thirteenth century as a
result of the growth of the justice-of-the-peace system. See 1 Ho~iswoRTH, A His-
TORY op THE ENGL sH LAWV 147-48 (1908). See also Morse, supra note 10, at 115.
The sheriff did retain the power to select the members of the panel. This is evi-
denced by a statute enacted in 1511-12 empowering the judges to alter the member-
ship of the panel to prevent a sheriff from staffing the jury with his own followers.
3 Hen. 8, c. 12. The statute, however, was short-lived. See Glaser, supra note 32,
at 203-04. Yet the abuse which it was designed to correct arose again. See Rex v.
Shaftesbury, 8 How. St. Tr. 759 (1681), and Trial of Colledge, 8 How. St. Tr. 549
(1681), in which a sheriff who was allied politically with persons accused of treason
hand-picked a grand jury which refused to indict. See EDWARs, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 29-30. Today, the matter is regulated in all states by statute. See, e._q, PA.
STAT. tit. 17, § 943 (1936).
39 See 1 HOLDSw0RTHz, op. cit. supra note 38, at 148.
40 See Glaser, supra note 32, at 202; Note, supra note 7, at 590.
4 1 See generally Ford, supra note 29, at 206; Kaufman, supra note 7, at 333-34.
This view is reflected in the constitutional guarantee of a grand jury. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The guarantee applies only to criminal defendants in federal courts;
states may abolish the practice of grand jury indictments. Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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this contravenes the "separation of powers" principle. "Separation of
powers" is actually a misnomer since many "powers" are held in common
by all three branches, with the power of investigation perhaps the most
dramatic.42 At the core of those situations which give rise to true "separa-
tion of powers" problems is a conflict-of-interest issue, namely, whether the
involvement of an official in the decision of a particular matter predisposes
him to act in a given way,4 3 or, otherwise stated, whether "a particular
combination [of functions] . . sets the official . . . to working at
cross-purposes." 44 For example, one acting both as judge and prosecutor
would severely jeopardize the right of a defendant to a fair trial. In con-
trast, it is questionable whether such a conflict exists when the regular grand
jury is unavailable and a judge organizes a special grand jury because he
has reason to believe that systematic corruption exists which requires imme-
diate investigation. The rights of those investigated are no more endan-
gered than they would be if the regular grand jury were able to act.
B. Common-Law Organization of Special Grand Juries
Once grand juries were established as judicial organs, the courts began
to organize them without statutory authorization in certain situations when
a grand jury was needed but was not otherwise available. Thus, if the
sheriff had for some reason failed to return a regular grand jury or had
returned one defective in its composition, the courts ordered the organiza-
tion of a new grand jury upon special venire.4 5 In addition, when crimes
were committed or criminals apprehended after the regular grand jury had
been discharged, the courts assumed the power to order the impanelling
of a new grand jury to return indictments.4 6 Justification for this unau-
thorized exercise of discretion was found in the jurisdiction of the criminal
court to supervise the organization of grand juries 47  Regardless of the
validity of this theoretical justification in the light of the history of the
grand jury, it is clear that the courts were reasonably attempting to cope
with a practical emergency. Since a grand jury indictment was required in
order to prosecute for a felony, the accused, absent a specially convened
grand jury, would be unjustly detained in jail until the beginning of the
next term of court when the regular grand jury could be organized or else
the charges against him would be dropped and he would be set free.
48
42 See generally Scigliano, Inquisitorial Proceedings ant Separation of Func-
tions: The Case of the Michigan One-Man Grand Jury, 38 U. DET. L. REv. 82-86
(1960).
43 Id. at 85.
44Ibid.
45 See 2 HA.L, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 156 (1723). See also Commonwealth v.
Burton, 31 Va. 645, 646-47 (1832) ; 4 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 27, at 440.
46 See authorities cited note 45 supra. See also State v. Brautigan, 310 Ill. 472,
477-78, 142 N.E. 208, 210 (1923) (dictum).
47 See Commonwealth v. Burton, 31 Va. 645, 646-47 (1832) ; People v. Blumen-
feld, 330 Ill. 474, 478, 161 N.E. 857, 858 (1928) (dictum).
48 Cf. id. at 477, 161 N.E. at 858.
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Although two grand juries did exist concurrently in three English
counties, 49 the general practice seems to have been that only one grand
jury at a time functioned in each county.50 No authority compelled this
practice; it seems to have arisen as a matter of tradition.
C. Present Status of the Judicial Power To Organize
The common-law development of discretionary power in the judiciary
to organize a special grand jury has set a pattern which modern decisions
have consistently followed. Analytically, however, the presence in each
state of a statute prescribing a procedure for organizing a grand jury has
added a new element which must be considered.
A minority of states accord their grand jury statutes preemptive
weight. Any deviation from the statutory procedure with respect to
ministerial matters such as jury lists, drawing jurors, and summoning them
to appear renders the grand jury functus officio and its indictments void.51
A fortiori, if a judge departs from the statute in ordering the organization
of a grand jury in these states, he is deemed to be acting beyond his au-
thority and to lack jurisdiction to make a valid order.5 2  Analyzing these
cases in jurisdictional terms seems highly questionable. If a judge, such as
a probate judge, who has not been vested with the power to organize a
grand jury should order the sheriff to return one, clearly there would be a
jurisdictional defect. But if a judge has the power to organize, an error
committed in the exercise of that power would hardly seem to be jurisdic-
tional in nature, although it may well be a ground for reversal.6
Most state courts take a more liberal view of a judge's failure to comply
with the terms of a procedural statute, looking in each case to see if his
error resulted in prejudice to the rights of those investigated or indicted.
When the judge has jurisdiction to organize and his error is not preju-
dicial, these courts refuse to invalidate the indictments on the ground that
the defect is not so substantial as to warrant the disruption of criminal
administration which would follow a declaration of invalidity. 4  Although
49 See State v. Brautigan, 310 Ill. 472, 477, 142 N.E. 208, 210 (1923) (dictum) ;
1 CHirr, CRIMINAL LAW 310 (3d ed. 1836), quoted in State v. Loveless, 142 W. Va.
809, 818 ,98 S.E.2d 773, 779 (1957) ; 2 HALF, op. cit. supra note 45, at 26.
60 See, e.g., State v. Brautigan, supra note 49 (dictum) ; Opinion to the Gover-
nor, 62 R.I. 200, 4 A.2d 487 (1939) (dictum). See also Chamberlin, supra note 31,
at 169.
51 See Scott v. State, 63 Ala. 59 (1879) ; Bruner v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. 239,
248-51, 28 Pac. 341, 344-45 (1891); Gladden v. State, 13 Fla. 623, 626-27 (1871);
Finnegan v. State, 57 Ga. 427, 429 (1876); State v. Brautigan, 310 Ill. 472, 478,
142 N.E. 208, 210; In the Matter of Frye, 173 Kan. 392, 395, 397, 246 P.2d 313,
316-17 (1952) ; Portis v. State, 23 Miss. 578 (1852). See generally EDWAmnS, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 47-48; 4 WHART N, op. cit. supra note 27, at 427.
62 See authorities cited note 51 supra.
53 See People ex re. Bonfils v. District Court, 29 Colo. 83, 85-86, 66 Pac. 1068,
1069-70 (1901) (per curiam) ; Bruner v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. 239, 270, 28 Pac. 341,
351 (1891) (dissenting opinion).
54 See Territory v. Chartz, 4 Ariz. 4, 6, 32 Pac. 166, 166-67 (1893) ; Sutton v.
State, 163 Ark. 562, 565-66, 260 S.W. 409, 410 (1924); People v. Byrd, 42 Cal. 2d
200, 206, 266 P.2d 505, 508, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 848 (1954); People ex rel.
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these cases in part manifest an impatience with nonprejudicial technicalities
asserted in order to quash an indictment, they also recognize a residual
power in the judiciary to organize a grand jury which does not in all
respects comport with the statutory requirements. This residual power
derives from the court's general power to organize grand juries and its
role as the traditional administrator of our system of criminal law.55
Mere error is involved in those cases in which a judge inadvertently
fails to adhere to the statutory procedure in organizing a regular grand
jury. A different situation arises when a judge consciously exercises his
discretion to organize a grand jury which is wholly unauthorized by statute.
In the minority jurisdictions in which technical noncompliance vitiates
a grand jury, such an exercise of discretion would manifestly be imper-
missible.56 The majority of states, however, do allow a judge certain
discretion to organize special, or nonstatutory, grand juries.
57
The concept of a residual power which was used to justify a refusal
to reverse a judge who failed to organize a regular grand jury in strict
accordance with the statute has also been used to support the exercise of
discretion in organizing a special grand jury.58 There has been no attempt
to define in terms the outer limits of this discretion; rather, it has been
limited by being particularized to those cases in which special grand juries
were organized at common law. Thus, as at common law, the majority of
jurisdictions permit a judge to order a special grand jury whenever a
regular grand jury is not attending the court, either because one was not
called,59 or because it was discharged before the alleged crime occurred or
before the accused was arrested.6° Similarly, the court may vacate an order
of discharge and recall the regular grand jury, provided the term of court
for which it was originally called has not expired.6 1 It has also been held
Bonfils v. District Court, supra note 53, at 85-86, 66 Pac. at 1069-70; Imboden v.
People, 40 Colo. 142, 152-53, 90 Pac. 608, 612-13 (1907); Meiers v. State, 56 Ind.
336, 341 (1877) ; State v. Disbrow, 130 Iowa 19, 21-23, 106 N.W. 263, 263-64 (1906) ;
People v. Morgan, 133 Mich. 550, 95 N.W. 542 (1903); People v. Petrea, 92 N.Y.
128, 143-44 (1883); Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382, 2 A.2d 298 (1938); State v.
Wescott, 194 Wis. 410, 217 N.W. 283 (1928).
55 See authorities cited note 54 supra.
56 See, e.g., State v. Brautigan, 310 Ill. 472, 142 N.E. 208 (1923) ; In the Matter
of Frye, 173 Kan. 392, 246 P.2d 313 (1952).
57 See, e.g., People v. Cochrane, 307 Ill. 126, 133, 138 N.E. 291, 294 (1923);
People v. Morgan, 133 Mich. 550, 95 N.W. 542 (1903) ; Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382,
2 A.2d 298 (1938).
58 See Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 782-85, 213 S.W.2d 370, 372-73, cert.
denied, 336 U.S 918 (1948); People v. Bonelli, 50 Cal. 2d 190, 192-93, 324 P.2d 1,
2 (1958) ; People v. Cochrane, 307 Ill. 126, 133, 178 N.E. 291, 294 (1923) ; State v.
Haines, 18 N.J. 550, 557-59, 115 A.2d 24, 28-29 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 20
N.J. 438, 120 A.2d 118 (1956).
59 See, e.g., Straughan v. State, 16 Ark. 37 (1855); People v. Blumenfeld, 330
Ili. 474, 478, 161 N.E. 857, 858 (1928).
60 See, e.g., Nichols v. State, 187 Ark. 999, 1001, 63 S.W.2d 655, 656 (1933);
Mackey v. People, 2 Colo. 13, 16 (1873) ; Stone v. People, 3 Ill. 326, 332-33 (1840) ;
State v. Disbrow, 130 Iowa 19, 21-23, 106 N.W. 263, 263-64 (1906) ; State v. Dusen-
berry, 112 Mo. 277, 289, 20 S.W. 461, 464 (1892).
61 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 92 Fla. 645, 109 So. 634 (1926) ; People v. McCauley,
256 Ill. 504, 100 N.E. 182 (1912).
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that a judge may order a grand jury to continue its work into a succeeding
term if this is necessary for the completion of unfinished business.62 This
discretion has been justified solely on the ground that the court has the
power to facilitate the efficient operation of the criminal judicial system.
63
If a grand jury had to halt its investigation on the last day of the term
and hand over its work to a succeeding grand jury, the investigation would
be needlessly disrupted, especially if it were a protracted one requiring many
change-overs.
Despite the existence of a general power to organize a grand jury
when the need is evident and legislative authority is lacking, this power
has not been used to organize two grand juries which would operate
simultaneously during the same term. Except in scattered cases, a judge's
order directing the impanelling of a second grand jury has been quashed on
the ground that the judge exceeded his jurisdiction.64 And yet, similarly
unauthorized orders to organize a special grand jury in the absence of a
regular grand jury, to recall a discharged regular grand jury, or to hold
over a regular grand jury have been held to be justifiable exercises of
judicial discretion and not in excess of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not,
therefore, a meaningful basis for analysis in this area; in fact, it is mislead-
ing, for actually the courts have looked to the common law for historical
support for their decisions. Unfortunately, their historical investigations
have been limited to a determination of whether individual powers were
exercised, and they have not explored the policy reasons underlying a
particular exercise of discretion.65 Those powers which were exercised by
62 People v. Bonelli, 50 Cal. 2d 190, 192-93, 324 P.2d 1, 2 (1958); People v.
Cochrane, 307 Ill. 126, 133, 138 N.E. 291, 294 (1923); People v. Kaplan, 56 Mich.
36, 239 N.W. 349 (1931); People v. Stem, 3 N.Y.2d 658, 148 N.E.2d 400, 171
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958); Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382, 2 A.2d 298 (1938). Contra,
In the Matter of Frye, 173 Kan. 392, 395, 346 P.2d 313, 316-17 (1952); State v.
Davis, 107 N.J.L. 199, 202-03, 152 Atl. 782, 783-84 (Sup. Ct. 1930); cf. Finnegan v.
State, 57 Ga. 427 (1876).
63 See, e.g., Shenker v. Harr, supra note 62, at 285-86, 2 A.2d at 299.
6 See O'Brien v. State, 91 Ala. 16, 18, 8 So. 559, 560 (1890) ; State v. Brautigan,
310 Ill. 472, 476-80, 142 N.E. 208, 210-11 (1923); State v. Davis, 107 N.J.L. 199,
203, 152 Atl. 782, 783-84 (1930); Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 185 A.2d 135
(1962); State v. Jacobs, 6 Tex. 99, 101 (1851); Nichols v. State, 187 Ark. 999,
1001, 63 S.W.?d 655, 656 (1933) (dictum); cf. State v. Overstreet, 128 Mo. 470,
472, 31 S.W. 35, 36 (1895) (dictum).
For cases which have permitted concurrent grand juries, see Shenker v. Harr,
332 Pa. 382, 2 A.2d 298 (1938); State v. Loveless, 142 W. Va. 809, 816-19, 98
S.E.2d 773, 779-80 (1957) ; The Queen v. McGuire, 34 N.B. 430, 4 Can. Crim. Cas. 12
(1898). It also appears that two grand juries existed simultaneously in two Penn-
sylvania cases in which this fact was not challenged. See Dauphin County Grand
Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1), 332 Pa. 289, 336; Commonwealth v. Evans,
190 Pa. Super. 179, 154 A.2d 57 (1959), aff'd per curian, 399 Pa. 387, 160 A.2d
407, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 899 (1960). Several states by statute permit judges to
call more than one grand jury. See People v. Manahan, 32 Cal. 68, 72 (1867);
People ex rel. Ferrill v. Graydon, 333 Ill. 429, 435, 164 N.E. 832, 834-35 (1928)
(distinguishing the leading case of State v. Brautigan, supra) ; State v. Haines, 18
N.J. 550, 556-59, 115 A.2d 24, 28-29 (1955) (statute overruled State v. Davis, supra) ;
People v. Stem, 3 N.Y.2d 658, 148 N.E.2d 400, 171 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958); State
ex rel. Doerfler v. Price, 101 Ohio St. 50, 128 N.E. 173 (1920). Rhode Island has
indicated in a questionable opinion that such a statute would violate its constitution.
Opinion to the Governor, 62 R.I. 200, 4 A.2d 487 (1939).
65 See cases cited notes 59-61 supra.
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common-law courts in England have been characterized as "inherent
powers" exercisable by a modern court; when a given exercise of power is
not supported by such authority, it has been considered invalid because not
within the court's "inherent power," as in the case of an order creating a
second grand jury upon special venire when another grand jury is already
in existence.68
The "inherent" versus "non-inherent" classification is unfortunate.
"Inherent power" suggests an undefined, unlimited authority in the court
which is naturally viewed with alarm. The existence of such a power in-
evitably spawns arbitrary attempts to define its limits, and this is precisely
what has occurred in the area of a court's power to organize a special
grand jury. Instead of exploring the nature of the judicial power and the
bases for a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion, courts too often have
woodenly confined the power to organize special grand juries to those
situations in which it was exercised by pre-Revolutionary English courts.
To the extent that the power has been recognized, it exists today in most
instances in the same form as in medieval England.
This judicial preoccupation with the common-law history has produced
an anomalous situation. In Pennsylvania, for example, it has recently been
held that it is beyond the power of a judge to order a special investigating
grand jury when the regular grand jury is still in session.67 It remains
Pennsylvania law, however, that a judge may, as a matter of discretion,
"hold over" a regular grand jury to continue an investigation into a suc-
ceeding term of court even though such an investigation would be made
concurrently with the functioning of the regular grand jury for that term.
68
This procedure, while eminently sensible, is equally without statutory au-
thority and equally without precedent at common law.
The concept of "inherent power," like that of "jurisdiction," does not
lead to a satisfactory analysis. Such an analysis must be based on an ex-
amination of the practical problem confronting the court and the alternatives
available for an acceptable solution. It must also consider whether the
resolution of the problem is properly the function of the judiciary. The
common-law courts' assumption of power to organize a special grand jury
in the absence of a regularly organized grand jury involved such an analysis.
Clearly, authority could have been provided by statute; but absent such
legislation, the judiciary, because charged with the general supervision of
the administration of criminal justice and capable of acting on an ad hoc
basis, was the appropriate body to fill a gap in the system.69
If properly applied, such an analysis would result in a reversal of the
"rule" against concurrently operating grand juries. This would be
especially significant in large metropolitan areas, where the workload of an
66 See cases cited note 64 supra.
67 Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 185 A.2d 135 (1962).
68 See Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382, 2 A.2d 298 (1938); Commonwealth v.
Hubbs, 137 Pa. Super. 229, 8 A-2d 611 (1939).
69 See authorities cited notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text.
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existing grand jury may preclude it from undertaking a new and prolonged
investigation, or may delay the investigation until it can no longer be effec-
live, particularly when the prosecutor has refused for political reasons to
initiate one on his own motion. If an investigation is necessary, even
though no explicit alternative has been provided by statute, a judge who
does not respond and organize a second grand jury will have failed to
satisfy the statutory duty imposed upon him through the court's investigat-
ing "arm," the grand jury, to investigate official misconduct.70 The public
may be led, moreover, to suspect that the judge's refusal to direct an in-
vestigation stems from political alliance with the prosecutor.
Although the general early English practice was to the contrary,71 it is
clear that two grand juries did exist simultaneously in three counties.72
The reason for these concurrent grand juries is unknown, but a Canadian
case 7 3 and a recent West Virginia decision 74 took note of their existence
and held that the organization of concurrent grand juries is within the
court's discretion. Underlying such decisions is a policy justification iden-
tical to that which supported the exercise of those powers which have been
regarded as "inherent"-the need to meet emergencies in the functioning of
the criminal judicial system.75 Considering the relative lack of sophistica-
tion of crime in medieval England and the limited popular control over the
operation of government, it is questionable whether two grand juries were
in fact necessary. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the problem was ever
considered by the English courts. To interpret this silence as a "rule"
against concurrently operating grand juries is to rely upon what is at best
questionable authority and to ignore the substance of the process by which
judicial control over the organization of grand juries developed. 76
The adoption of statutes explicitly expanding the scope of a judge's
power to order investigations of corruption could easily obviate the "power"
problem. In the absence of such statutes, however, the substitution of a
more flexible judicial discretion for the formalistic application of common-
law rules would seem to be not only more consistent with the common-law
history but also the most effective method for protecting the public from
corruption when the regular grand jury is unavailable.
70 See authorities cited notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
71 See authorities cited note 50 .vpra.
72 See authorities cited note 49 supra.
73 The Queen v. McGuire, 34 N.B. 430, 4 Can. Crim. Cas. 12 (1898).
74 State v. Loveless, 142 W. Va. 809, 98 S.E.2d 773 (1957).
75 See authorities cited notes 45-48 .rpra and accompanying text
76Attempts to justify the "rule" on policy grounds have been singularly un-
persuasive. It has been argued that a second "investigatory" grand jury would
endanger civil rights, see State ex rel. Doerfler v. Price, 101 Ohio St. 50, 59-60, 128
N.E. 173, 176 (1920); Opinion to the Governor, 62 R.I. 200, 208, 4 A.2d 487, 490
(1939), especially in view of the fact that through the grand jury a prosecutor
obtains the power to subpoena records and persons. Although such a danger may
exist, it seems to have more relevance to the standards which should be met before
a petition for a special grand jury is granted. The regular grand jury possesses
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D. Proposed Limitations on the Exercise of Judicial Discretion
As a matter of legal or political theory, therefore, there exist no sub-
stantial obstacles to the exercise of judicial discretion to organize a special
investigating grand jury. The possibility that such power will be abused,
however, has in part been responsible for the courts' reluctance to sanction
its exercise. Most important is a lingering apprehension that a politically
motivated judge will seek to embarrass an opposition regime when in fact
there are no reliable grounds to support a suspicion of corruption. 77 In
addition, a major investigation can involve great cost to the taxpayer 7
8
and considerable disruption of government operations, since records are
subpoenaed and officers are called from their jobs to testify. Moreover,
the possibility that a court acting through a grand jury will, in effect, be-
come a permanent overseer of executive and legislative performance is
repugnant to the concept of representative government. 79 Nevertheless, the
probity of a public official should unquestionably be subject to public
surveillance, and it is this need for public knowledge of official misconduct
which is the strongest justification for permitting judicial discretion in
organizing a special grand jury. Essentially, fear of abuse of this power is
caused by the unjustifiable "judicial" investigation and not by an investiga-
tion ordered on the basis of substantial charges of corruption. Possible
abuse is no reason to deny the existence of the power altogether. Instead,
certain conditions should be required before the power can be exercised.
Many states provide by statute that a judge may order a grand jury
to investigate certain charges whenever he deems it necessary.80 This, of
course, places no effective limits on his power. When a judge is to exer-
cise discretion to organize a special, or non-statutory, investigating grand
the same powers of investigation as the special investigating grand jury, and yet
it has not been viewed as a danger to civil rights.
It has also been argued that a second grand jury is an unjustifiable expense of
public money. See Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 569, 185 A.2d 135, 144 (1962) ;
Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382, 383-84, 2 A.2d 298, 299 (1938). One of the pur-
poses of the Michigan "one-man" grand jury was to reduce the costs of investiga-
tion. See Scigliano, The Grand Jury, the Information, and the Judicial Inquiry,
38 ORE. L. REv. 303, 311 (1959). However, when it is clear that an "investigatory"
grand jury is necessary, it would seem that the expense involved is the price of
good government. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the "public' would
prefer the successful depletion of public funds by unchecked corruption to the expense
of exposing such crime and punishing it. The very weakness of these arguments
suggests the need for re-evaluation of the "rule' in light of modern circumstances.
77 See Finley v. State, 61 Ala. 201, 207 (1878); O'Byrnes v. State, 51 Ala.
25, 29 (1874); Bruner v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. 239, 243-44, 28 Pac. 341, 342
(1891). See generally Van Voorhis, supra note 30, at 5-6.
78To pay for the preliminary expenses of the proposed special grand jury
investigation of municipal corruption in Philadelphia in 1962, the Philadelphia City
Council appropriated $112,000. More was to be provided when needed. See Smith v.
Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 569, 185 A.2d 135, 144 (1962).
79 See Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382, 388-89, 2 A.2d 298, 301 (1938), in which
the court in dictum stated that a judge who "held over" a grand jury for such a
period of time as to render it virtually permanent would be abusing his discretion.
80 See, e.g., ARiz. R. CaIm. P. 81 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 904; CoNN. GvN.
STAT. ANN. §54-45 (1960).
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jury, that discretion should be subject to more stringent restriction. If
the state has provided for grand jury investigations, the judge should utilize
existing machinery as far as possible. If for some reason that machinery is
inadequate, only then should he consider whether to order a special panel.
The substance of the charges made would then become significant. Case
law in Pennsylvania requires that before a regular grand jury investigation
can be undertaken, the judge must be satisfied on the basis of trustworthy
information that a system of crime exists which affects the entire com-
munity, that it cannot be uncovered by the usual modes of criminal investiga-
tion, and that there is evidence of at least one "cognate" offense."' This
standard is uniquely stringent when compared to the standards other states
have established for regular grand jury investigations, but is particularly
suitable for cases in which a judge is asked to order an investigation for
which no statutory authority can be found. For ordinary crime, the detec-
tion processes of the police are generally deemed adequate; when they are
not, all states statutorily provide for some form of "judicial" investigation.
The special investigating grand jury should be viewed as an additional
extraordinary weapon and resorted to only when the situation demands
extraordinary action. The social utility of politically impartial "judicial"
investigations would thereby be recognized while the possibility of abuse
would be curbed through the imposition of stringent standards.
E. Standing To Petition for a Special Grand Jury
The local prosecuting attorney ordinarily presents the petition re-
questing a judge to organize an investigatory grand jury.82  Through the
grand jury, he can gain access to information which would otherwise be
beyond his reach, since he does not possess the necessary subpoena
power. However, standing to petition for an investigation should not be
limited to the prosecuting attorney, whose political allegiances may make
him reluctant to initiate an investigation of alleged political corruption. As
a former Michigan governor and attorney general declared to a state legis-
lative committee:
It is when there is official misconduct, bribery and corruption
and vice of a commercialized nature, that local prosecutors and
local officials hesitate because of the knowledge that they them-
selves may be involved. It is not in [their] mind to investigate
someone higher 8 4
81 See Special Grand Jury Case, 397 Pa. 254, 257-60, 154 A.2d 592, 595-96
(1959).
8 2 1In Pennsylvania, for example, only three of twventy-twvo petitions for grand
jury investigations have been filed by private citizens, see Hamilton Appeal, 407
Pa. 366, 376-81, 180 A.2d 782, 787-89 (1962) (concurring opinion), to which must
be added the petition in Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 185 A.2d 135 (1962).
83 See Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE
L.J. 687, 697 (1932).
s Statement of Wilbur M. Brucker, in Hearings Before Senate Interin Study
Committee, Mich. Legislature, Extra Sess. (1950), quoted in Scigliano, supra note 76,
at 309.
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When there is a possibility that crimes of this nature have been committed,
involving depletion of the public treasury and the use of public office for
personal gain, the need for grand jury investigation is paramount. Failure
of the prosecuting attorney to initiate a probe should not automatically
preclude all investigative processes. The public interest here seems sig-
nificant enough to justify granting individual taxpayers standing to peti-
tion for an investigation. However, a prosecuting attorney is an elected
official, and the granting of such a petition will inevitably reflect upon his
integrity. The court, moreover, is being asked to exercise a power un-
authorized by statute. Consequently, the petition should not be granted
unless the court is convinced that there is a concrete need for an investiga-
tion which the prosecuting attorney has failed to recognize, with great
weight being given to the prosecuting attorney's testimony that he has in-
vestigated the charges and found them groundless.
II. THE POWER To ENSURE AN EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION
A. Appointing a Special Prosecutor
Once the grand jury has been convened, a prosecutor will provide it
with legal assistance 8 5 Generally, the local district attorney will act as
prosecutor, 6 since the evidence gathered by the grand jury may be used by
the state in prosecuting those ultimately indicted.87 His role in directing
the investigation is pervasive; he interviews potential witnesses and deter-
mines who will testify, conducts the interrogation before the grand jury,
and advises on the law and the sufficiency of the evidence.8 8 Because of
his position as a lawyer and elected prosecutor, he is normally highly effec-
tive and persuasive.89 The National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement has concluded that "the grand jury is seldom better than a
rubber stamp of the prosecuting attorney .... ." 9o Although a grand
85 See generally MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEm 127 (1955) ; Appleton,
Special Counsel for Grand Juries, 8 THE PANEL 1 (No. 5, 1930); Daru, Broadening
the Scope of the Grand Jury, 12 THE PANEL 12 (1934); Dession & Cohen, supra
note 83, at 698; Littleton, Official Conduct (Auditing) Grand Juries, 11 THE PANEL
21, 30 (1933); Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARv. L. REV.
590, 597 (1961); Note, The Grand Jury-Its Investigatory Powers and Limitations,
37 MINN. L. REv. 586, 599-602 (1953).
86 See People ex rel. District Attorney v. District Court, 75 Colo. 412, 225 Pac.
829 (1924).
87 Ibid.
88 See U.S. NATIONAL COMi'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON PROSECUTION 124-25 (1931); Dession '& Cohen, supra note 83, at 697-700;
Kranitz, The Grand Jury: Past-Present-No Future, 24 Mo. L. REv. 318, 328
(1959); Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REV. 295, 325-29
(1931); Note, supra note 85, at 596-97.
89 See authorities cited note 88 supra.
,90 U.S. NATIONAL Com'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, op. cit. .upra
note 88 at 124-25. Although many have argued that a special prosecutor is needed
to lessen this control, see authorities cited note 88 supra, Professor Konowitz has
suggested the organization of "blue ribbon" grand juries whose members would be
more educated than the ordinary juror and thus more familiar with the law and
less dependent upon the elected prosecutor. See Konowitz, The Grand Jury as an
Investigating Body of Public Officials, 10 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 219, 230-31 (1936).
SPECIAL INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY
jury may exclude a prosecutor if dissatisfied with his presentation and
conduct its investigation without any assistance, its lack of investigative
experience and familiarity with the law virtually precludes a meaningful
investigation.9 1
Most states by statute authorize the court to appoint a special pros-
ecutor when the regular prosecuting attorney is absent because of death or
illness or when he is disqualified because of "interest" in the outcome of the
investigation. 92 Moreover, in most states the attorney general is statutorily
authorized to supersede the local prosecutor either at the court's request
or on his own motion. 8 Absent such statutory authority, courts have held
that, as a matter of discretion, they could appoint special prosecutors under
these same circumstances in the exercise of their "inherent power." 9
Even though the "inherent power" rationale is still subject to the same
objections interposed with respect to the organization of special grand
juries,95 the courts' interest in supervising the proper use of their machinery
and protecting the judicial system from political or personal misuse justifies
their exercise of extraordinary power. Again, the possibility that a court
will abuse this power to remove an elected officer has resulted in judicial
reluctance at the appellate level to allow a lower court to appoint a special
prosecutor when the elected prosecutor is present and competent, unless
there is a sufficient showing of the elected prosecutor's "interest" in the
outcome of the investigation.9 6
91See Dession & Cohen, supra note 83, at 696-99; Konowitz, supra note 90,
at 231. A striking example can be found in the investigation which led to the New
York Extraordinary Grand Jury. The regular grand jury had excluded the district
attorney and sought to conduct an investigation without his assistance. Its attempt
was futile, and it thereafter requested Governor Lehman to appoint an Extraor-
dinary Grand Jury. Thomas Dewey was appointed as prosecutor and impressive
discoveries of corruption were made. See Lindsay, Extraordinary Grand Jurier Per-
forming Important Service in Stamping Out Crime Under Leadership of Thomas
Dewey, 14 THE PANEL 3 (No. 1, 1936); Wilkes, A History Making Grand Jury,
13 THE PANEL 1 (No. 2, 1935).
92 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CoDe § 935; CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-1-7 (1953) ; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 27.16 (1961).
93 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 235 (1960) ; CAL. PEN. CODE § 936; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 297 (1962).
94 See, e.g., People ex rel. Lindsley v. District Court, 29 Colo. 5, 12-17, 66 Pac.
896, 898-99 (1901) (interest) ; Mitchell v. State, 22 Ga. 211, 232 (1857) (absence) ;
State v. Corcoran, 7 Idaho 220, 61 Pac. 1034 (1900) (interest) ; State v. Gonzales,
26 Tex. 197 (1862) (dictum); State ex rel. Kelly v. Alcorn, 6 Conn. Supp. 210,
214-15 (Super. Ct. 1938) (dictum) (interest); King v. State, 43 Fla. 211, 222, 31
So. 254, 257 (1901) (dictum) (absence).
95 See notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text
96 See Gray v. District Court, 42 Colo. 298, 303, 94 Pac. 287, 288-89 (1908);
State ex rel. Spencer v. Criminal Court, 214 Ind. 551, 557, 15 N.E.2d 1020, 1022-23
(1938) ; State v. Brown, 63 Kan. 262, 65 Pac. 213 (1901) ; cf. Seaton v. Polk County,
59 Iowa 626, 13 N.W. 725 (1882). But cf. Taylor v. State, 49 Fla. 69, 75-78, 38 So.
380, 382-3 (1905); Mitchell v. State, 22 Ga. 211, 232 (1857); Commonwealth v.
Lehman, 309 Pa. 486, 490-93, 164 Atl. 526, 527-28 (1932).
Occasionally, however, it has been presumed that a showing of interest was
made in the absence of anything in the record to the contrary. See Williams v.
State, 188 Ind. 283, 301, 123 N.E. 209, 215 (1919); cf. Davis v. People, 77 Colo.
546, 553, 238 Pac. 25, 28 (1925).
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The courts have been hesitant in finding "interest" when the prosecutor
was not one of those being investigatedY7 The fact that the prosecutor
and those allegedly guilty of corruption were politically allied has not gen-
erally been considered sufficient to justify appointing a special prosecutor
unconnected with the persons in power9 And yet, the realities of political
life raise significant doubts that an investigation controlled by a prosecutor
who owes his position and salary to those under investigation will be faith-
fully and vigorously pursuedY9 Comparison of the spectacular disclosures
of corruption made by the New York Extraordinary Grand Jury with
Thomas Dewey as special prosecutor and by the Michigan "one-man"
grand juries assisted by special prosecutors 100 with the results of ordinary
grand jury investigations conducted by regular prosecutors underscores
this conclusion.1 1 The possibility that public cynicism concerning the
political independence of the judiciary may be occasioned by the use of the
grand jury process to "whitewash" certain public officials is even more
significant in the long run than the possibility that corrupt officials may
escape detection and prosecution. Moreover, the same public reaction
might well occur even if the district attorney conscientiously directed a
grand jury investigation which resulted in the dismissal of the charges as
unfounded.
As a safeguarding measure, therefore, the burden should be shifted
to the district attorney to come forward with evidence of his fitness to
conduct an investigation of his political associates, leaving the risk of non-
persuasion on the petitioner. The district attorney should not only be
required to explain his previous failure to act, but also to demonstrate that
he is impartial in fact and that his public stature is such that the public's
respect for the judiciary will not be impaired if he is permitted to fulfill
his statutory function. If the court finds him unsuited for the task, it should
exhaust all possible alternatives, including a request to the attorney general
to supersede, 10 2 before exercising its supervisory power over its own
machinery '0 3 to disqualify him. The district attorney is a court officer; to
the extent that his actions may undermine the public's concept of judicial
impartiality, they should be regulated by the court.
97 See Gray v. District Court, supra note 96; State ex rel. Spencer v. Criminal
Court, supra note 96; Sayles v. Newton, 82 Mich. 84, 46 N.W. 29 (1890); Smith v.
Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 583-88, 185 A.2d 135, 151-53 (1962).
98 See authorities cited note 97 supra.
99 See Appleton, supra note 85, at 1; Scigliano, supra note 76, at 309-10.
100 See Scigliano, Inquisitorial Proceedings and Separation of Functions: The
Case of the Michigan One-Man Grand Jury, 38 U. DET. L. REv. 82, 86-87 (1960).
lo Compare Wilkes, supra note 91, and Marsh, Michigan's "One Man Grand
Jury," 8 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 121, 123 (1924), with Konowitz, supra note 90, at
223-24.
102 See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
103 See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
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B. Binding the Public Treasury for Expenses Incurred
in the Investigation
Although a court has the power to organize a special grand jury and
appoint special prosecutors, the success of the investigation may ultimately
depend on whether it has the power to obtain the funds necessary to com-
pensate the special prosecutor, his assistants, investigators, and office staff,
and to pay for office facilities.104 There is no problem if the state has a
statute authorizing funds for such court-appointed officials 15 or if the
regular appropriation made for the court is sufficient to cover these ex-
penses. But if this is not the case, necessary assistance can only be ob-
tained if the court has the power to bind the public treasury for the costs
of the investigation.
In cases arising in other contexts, the liability of the public treasury for
costs resulting from the exercise of judicial discretion has usually been
contingent on the power of the court to rule as it did; 106 if the order was
within the court's authority, the costs have been assumed to be a public
charge.10 7 In finding the requisite authority, courts have again resorted
to the concept of "inherent power" 108 to justify actions which were neces-
sary for the efficient administration of the criminal judicial system. There
are also many cases which in dictum recognize the power to appoint various
personnel when the regular procedures are for some reason inadequate and
the appointments are "necessary" for efficient administration. 09
1041 In Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 185 A.2d 135 (1962), the court noted that
the special prosecutor was to be paid a salary of $20,000 a year, the special assistant
prosecutor was to be paid $17,500 a year, that offices had been rented to serve as
headquarters for the investigation, and that the staff included attorneys, investigators,
detectives, stenographers, and clerks. Id. at 582, 185 A.2d at 150. The Philadelphia
City Council had appropriated $112,000 to meet the expenses of the investigation.
Id. at 569, 185 A.2d at 144. In argument before the trial court, the city solicitor
had indicated that this was only to cover preliminary expenses and that the total
cost might be a million dollars. Id. at 583, 185 A.2d at 151.
105 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 936.
106 See, e.g., Schmelzel v. Board of Comm'rs, 16 Idaho 32, 100 Pac. 106, 107
(1909); State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 137 Pac. 392 (1913); Board
of County Commrs v. Devine, 72 Nev. 57, 294 P.2d 366 (1956); Committee for
Marion County Bar Ass'n v. County of Marion, 162 Ohio St 345, 123 N.E.2d 521, 522
(1954) ; Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577, 578 (1949).
107 See Board of Comm'rs v. Stout, 136 Ind. 53, 35 N.E. 683 (1893) (court
order requiring the county to operate the courthouse elevator at certain times, cost
to be borne by the county, upheld); In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490
(1912) (court's refusal to move to inadequate new quarters upheld even though it
forced the county to renew its lease on the old courtroom); Merrill v. Phelps, 52
Ariz. 526, 532-33, 84 P.2d 74, 79 (1938) (dictum) (appointment of bailiff by the
court); State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 330-32, 137 Pac. 392, 396
(1913) (dictum) (appointment of bailiff by the court) ; Stone v. Bell, 35 Nev. 240,
246-47, 129 Pac. 458, 460 (1913) (dictum) (court-appointed accountant).
108 E.g., Nicholl v. Koster, 157 Cal. 416, 422-24, 108 Pac. 302, 305 (1910);
State ex rel. Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont 165, 166-68, 101 Pac. 962, 963
(1909) (alternative holding) ; Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 54-55, 66 A.2d 577, 578
(1949) (dictum).
109 See, e.g., Merrill v. Phelps, 52 Ariz. 526, 535-36, 84 P.2d 74, 79 (1938);
State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 328-32, 137 Pac. 392, 395-96 (1913);
Board of County Comm'rs v. Devine, 72 Nev. 57, 60, 294 P.2d 366, 367 (1956);
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Since the appointment of a special prosecutor is considered to be within
the "inherent power" of a court, it seems likely that the court can fix his
salary and require the county auditor to approve payment. Similarly, since
it is considered within the "inherent power" of a court to require the
executive to provide adequate facilities for the functioning of the judi-
ciary,110 the court could probably order that provision be made for office
space at public cost. However, there are cases which hold that even though
a court has the "inherent power" to appoint a special prosecutor, the power
to appoint investigators, and, presumably, office staff, can only be conferred
by statute."' This distinction between appointment of special prosecutors
and investigators is yet another result of the inflexible confinement of the
"inherent power" doctrine to those precise situations in which the English
common-law courts exercised their power.
A grand jury investigation would probably not be significantly im-
paired by the lack of specially hired investigators or office staff if it were
supported by the local law-enforcement authorities."12 In view of the cost
savings "3 as well as the propriety of allowing those authorities to perform
Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 57-58, 66 A.2d 577, 579-80 (1949); cf. Fresno County
v. Roberson, Martin & Co., 124 Cal. App. 2d 888, 269 P.2d 252 (Super. Ct. 1954).
For the few cases which actually uphold the validity of the public charge, see
Nicholl v. Koster, 157 Cal. 416, 108 Pac. 302 (1910) ; In re Appointment of the Clerk
of the Court of Appeals, 297 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957) (alternative holding);
State ex rel. Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 173, 101 Pac. 962, 964 (1909)
(alternative holding). These cases involved a probation officer, a clerk, and a
stenographer, respectively; such persons differ from special prosecutors in that they
are more in the nature of court functionaries. No case was found which involved
a challenge to the appointment of a special prosecutor or the organization of a special
grand jury on financial grounds. Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 185 A.2d 135
(1962), although a taxpayer's suit, was essentially a collateral attack on the validity
of the order organizing the grand jury. Presumably, had the order been upheld,
the costs would have been considered public charges. It is perhaps significant that
none of the challenges to the validity of the appointments of special prosecutors in
the cases cited in notes 94, 96-97 supra were based on financial grounds.
110 See, e.g., State ex tel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 Pac. 689 (1902);
Zangerle v. Court of Common Pleas, 141 Ohio St. 70, 46 N.E.2d 865 (1943); In re
Court Room, 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490 (1912).
"l Allen v. Payne, 1 Cal. 2d 607, 36 P.2d 614 (1934); Woody v. Peairs, 35
Cal. App. 553, 170 Pac. 660 (Dist. Ct. App. 1917). Clearly, the grand jury itself
does not have the power to hire investigators, since it is believed that those who
finance investigations out of their own pockets will lose the impartiality necessary
for a valid grand jury indictment. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. Doyle, 46 Nev.
91, 208 Pac. 427 (1922) (contract was void as against public policy and therefore
the agency could not sue the individual members of the grand jury which had
employed it); People v. Kempley, 265 Pac. 310 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928), modified,
205 Cal. 441, 271 Pac. 478 (1928).
112 It has been proposed that a statute be passed authorizing the creation of a
permanent special staff in the district attorney's office which would specialize in
assisting grand jury investigations. The staff would be composed of skilled inves-
tigators appointed by the state on the basis of a civil service examination. The
proposal is designed to preclude political ififluence by m aklng the investigating unit a
continuing one divorced from political changes. See Daru, supra note 85, at 12.
113 The amount of money required may be a significant element in a finding of
lack of "necessity" for the appointment. Whenever the "inherent power" of a court
was invoked to support a public charge, relatively small amounts of money were
almost always involved. In the two cases involving sizable expenditures, Board of
Comm'rs v. Gwin, 136 Ind. 562, 36 N.E. 237 (1894) (court order to rebuild the
courthouse), and Committee for Marion County Bar Ass'n v. Marion County, 162
Ohio St. 345, 123 N.E.2d 521 (1954) (court order to build an elevator in the
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their designated functions, the court should whenever possible permit them
to provide investigative assistance. Nevertheless, collusion between law-
enforcement officials and those under investigation should not be allowed
to destroy an investigation. It is equally "necessary" to the effective ful-
fillment of the duty of investigation imposed upon the court's investigating
"arm" that the court have the power to appoint investigators and assistants
as well as the power to appoint a special prosecutor.
III. CONCLUSION
Because of its unique investigative powers, the grand jury is potentially
the most effective body to which the public can look for exposure of cor-
ruption. This potential has not been fully realized because of the inflexible
application of common-law "rules" regarding the court's "inherent power."
Yet the "rules" themselves are but the products of ad hoc attempts to
remedy problems relating to the operation of the criminal judicial system
which Parliament had not sought to regulate. Rigid adherence to these
practices without reference to their underlying rationales and their ap-
plicability to modern circumstances has greatly diminished the utility of
grand jury investigations. The problem is appropriately the subject of
legislation, and some states, notably California and Michigan, do have
statutes governing the power of a court to organize investigatory grand
juries114 and to replace the district attorney with a politically neutral
prosecutor." 5  Absent such legislation, however, a review of the grand
jury's development and the power of the courts to supervise and administer
the criminal judicial system indicates that courts do have the power to act
in extraordinary situations. To deny this nonstatutory power is to impair
effective public control of governmental corruption, thereby undermining
public faith in the political impartiality of the judiciary.
David C. Toomey
courthouse), the courts failed to find the requisite "necessity." These orders were
directed toward permanent improvements rather than emergency repairs, and it was
on this ground that the court in State ex rel. Finley v. Pfeiffer, 163 Ohio St. 149,
154-55, 126 N.E.2d 57, 60-61 (1955), harmonized Marion County with Zangerle v.
Court of Common Pleas, 141 Ohio St 70, 46.N.E.2d 865 (1943), which upheld an
order requiring the holder of an office adjacent to the courtroom to vacate so that
the court might expand its facilities.
114 See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 904, 925; MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.943-.945 (1954).
Georgia has approached this problem by giving extraordinary powers to its regular
grand juries. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 59-309 to -312 (1933).
115 See CAl. PEN. CODE §§ 935-36; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.944 (1954). Georgia
has not authorized the appointment of special prosecutors; however, it has lessened
the prosecutor's control by giving the grand jury power to appoint accountants and
other investigators to assist its inquiry. GA. CoDE A N. § 59-310 (1933).
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